New Cold Wars: Book Review

New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russian Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West, David Sanger, 2024.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by 1990, the end of history was declared (by political scientist Francis Fukuyama). Forward to 2023: This is not the world we wanted, or were trying to shape, after the Cold War, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, February 2023. Things did not work out as planned. The claim had been the west had won, with democracy, capitalism, and the rule of law. Both Russia and China would embrace the Western World of Capitalism and democracy. Not so fast. Risks and uncertainties were extreme. Putin thought he was Peter the Great. Xi Jinping though the US was declining, and China was rising to take over the world.

Prologue: The Mother Lode. The Russians were getting ready to roll: October 2021. Putin claimed Ukraine as part of the Russian empire. The CIA had extensive intel. Biden sent CIA Director Bill Burns to engage Putin. Some 60% of Russia’s land-based force was on the border. The idea was to capture Kiev and kill Zelensky within days. Russia hacked Ukraine electronically. The expectation was a severe cyberattack would cripple Ukraine’s response. The US and Microsoft were sent to defend against attacks. The cyberattack happened February 23, 2022. One fear was the digital war could result in a war against NATO. Companies (Microsoft, Starlink, and Google) were at the front line of support.

Russia attacked, with their forces overestimated and Ukraine’s fighting spirit not appreciated. The Russian attack was inept, including not telling the soldiers they were invading another country. Within months they were retreating. General Milley noted: “It is part 1914, pat 1941, and part 2022” (p. 15).

The Shape of the New Cold War. The global shock was the renewed superpower conflict and a land war in Europe. Earlier was Russia’s invasion of Georgia and Crimea, Putin’s move into Syria and effort to influence the US election. Beijing started the Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei. The US had ridiculous wars in the Middle East, but assumed Russia and China would integrate into the West. Clinton brought Xi into the WTO. Obama did not call Putin out. Trump wanted to be a Putin or Xi style authoritarian. With Covid Trump blamed China (“China virus,” “Kung-Flu”).  Biden advisor: “Just about every assumption across different administrations was wrong” (p. 19). Authoritarians wanted to stay authoritarians.  

The “Washington Consensus” was that globalism meant economic growth and political stability. The cognitive dissonance: this expectation versus reality. When Biden took over, America was in the middle of COVID, Trump was trying to retain power, NATO had problems, and China (military, economic, and technological) and Russia (military) were disruptive and seemed ascendant. China remained a trading partner. The Biden team believed the answer was to rebuild American capacity while starving China of technology. That included a $52 billion act for chipmakers to build domestically.

“The crisis in Ukraine posed a classic, direct challenge to the West—whether it would defend an emerging, if corrupt-ridden, democracy against Putin. … The war was regional; the stakes were global” (p. 23). American involvement was an option, not inevitable. That worked in year one, including reviving NATO. China’s population was shrinking and China rejected the West’s COVID vaccines. What is the future? All of Biden’s measures cost money, with the national debt over $30 trillion.

The Hamas attack created another crisis, demonstrating the incompetence of Netanyahu’s self-interest and authoritarian aspirations. The US was stuck supporting Israel not matter how inhumane. Biden called for limited civilian deaths with limited (or zero) success. Other nations attacked the US for supporting Israel at all.

Pat One: Dreaming of One World. Chapter 1: Floating Part the Hermitage. “Who lost Russia? It’s an old argument and it misses the point. Russia was never ours to lose” (Bill Burns, CIA Director). After 9/11 America was at war with Afghanistan and Bush had gone to Moscow to get help from Putin. One idea was Russia would join the WTO and perhaps the EU—"strategic cooperation.” Putin wanted what he could get from the West, not really end the Cold War. That included joint projects with Putin possibly thinking he was an equal partner and again become a global superpower. Then came the ridiculous Iraq War, which Putin opposed and the relationship soured.

Spies operated under “Moscow Rules.” In the mid-1990s privatization put the Russian economy in free fall, creating rich oligarchs. Organized crime expanded. NATO expanded, which George Kennan was against because it would have a negative effect on Russian opinion (the point assumed to be to kill Slavs). Then NATO bombed Kosovo. Bill Burns became ambassador to Russia in 2005. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution of 2004 suggested that the country wanted to turn west. Too early, Ukraine was still corrupt.

Fiona Hill “emerged in Washington as one of the most perceptive biographers of Putin (p. 40),” viewed Putin as “an angry, grievance-ridden bundle of contradictions. … His problem was that he didn’t understand the West—and saw the world through the shadows of his KGB experience” (p. 40). Condoleezza Rice focused on Putin’s belief in Russian exceptionalism and Western decadence and decline. Robert Gates claimed “One Cold War was quite enough” (p. 44). One problem was how the West underreacted to Russian aggression: cyberattacks, invading Georgia, destabilizing Eastern Europe dependent on Russian gas with Ukraine a particular target.

Obama wanted a “reset,” but dealt with Dmitry Medvedev. “Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th century agenda with 21st century tactics” (p. 4). Obama and Medvedev signed New Start reducing the number of nukes: stability rather than progress. Navalny was a Putin critic and started his cycle of in and out of prison and survived being poisoned. He died in prison in 2023.

Chapter 2: The Lost Decade. China joined the WTO under Clinton’s watch on the assumption it would move toward democracy. Robert Rubin, Clinton’s Secretary of the Treasury visited China in 1997, expected China to move from inefficient state-owned firms to a market economy. China cracked down on Hong Kong, claimed expanded rights to the South China Seas and threaten Taiwan. US union members, part of the Democratic base, opposed China in the WTO. China figured out how opening China’s markets could be done without changing the political system.

Of course, American capitalists wanted into Chinese markets—the usual short-term profit thinking. Too bad about the theft of Western technology. Millions were lifted out of poverty in China (but unequally) as GDP expanded geometrically. China had no interest in improving human rights. Bush (W) was clueless on how to respond. China figured out how to change some of the rules for trade and pegged (at an undervalued rate) its currency to the dollar, making exports cheaper. Then the cyber exploitation campaigns for national security data, including building the F-35. Xi was portrayed as a masterful political mythmaker. China’s counterintelligence dismantled the CIA’s China spying operations. Then the crackdown against the Uyghurs.

The Belt and Road initiative was used to bring Asian and African countries into the Chinese orbit, including Huawei to control communications. China bought US farmland and Huawei offered cheap bids for rural telecom carriers even in the US. There was a Chinese police ring to target Chinese “dissidents.” China stole the security files of 22 million federal employees to understand elite vulnerabilities. China wanted to lead the world in critical technologies including semiconductors and long-range batteries, robotics, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. China bought many Silicon Valley startups. China flooded the world with cheap steel. The military worried about losing the semiconductor industry although politicians were not. The overall US critique: the US wasn’t changing fast enough to deal with the strategic challenges, including understanding that China wanted global power more than profits.

That all meant remaking the world order in its image: the “Thucydides Trap” (turning Athens into Sparta) based in part on perceived US weaknesses: “2008 financial crisis, then Obama’s unwillingness to draw red lines or call out affronts, then the isolation and chaos of the Trump years, emboldened Beijing to make its move” (p. 75). Presumably, China’s path was unknowable until Xi made it obvious (according to Avril Haines who served in Obama’s administration and returned as Biden’s Director of National Intelligence). Biden understood that the relationship became adversarial.

Chapter 3: Putin’s Seven-Year Itch. “Every 7 to 8 years Putin ended up trying to seize or otherwise bring to heel another part of the old Russian empire. Chechnya in 1999-2000, Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and then all of Ukraine in 2022” (p. 79). Putin had been described as a great strategist including hacking and disinformation in America. Ukraine president Yanukovich was corrupt and wanted closer ties to Russia, then fled after he was going to be impeached. Then protests across Ukraine. That’s when Putin moved against Crimea. The US and the west did essentially nothing, except send non-military aid. Biden as VP wanted a harder line. Hunter Biden was a lobbyist with an addiction. HR McMaster called the non-response “strategic narcissism.”

Chapter 4: America First. The Army believed Putin’s Russia was developing new warfare capabilities, based in part on taking Crimea in 2014. The result was power competition and a new national security strategy under Trump. Of course, Trump claimed NATO was obsolete. Trump also claimed Russia had not involvement in the 2016 election. McMaster was replaced by John Bolton (#3 National Security Advisor), who supposedly saw war and aggression as the policies of first resort. Bolton claimed “Trump’s foreign policy thinking was like an archipelago of dots, leaving the rest of us to discern or create policy” (p. 99). He discovered Trump cared only about ending trade deficits with China. Tariffs on solar panels, steel, and more, matched by China’s tariffs on soybeans, autos, etc. Then Trump bailed out US farmers. It also meant the US did not interfere with China’s gaining technological and military dominance. China was playing dirty tricks with cyberattacks and much else—all in violation of China’s promises. Limiting Huawei and ZTE access was important to ensure China could not shutdown networks and cripple the US communications grid. The Trumpers fought against China but had no overall strategy.

Rex Tillerson was Secretary of State but never figured out that diplomacy differed from an oil company. Historically, state sounded the alarm of economic threats from China, but business lobbied to keep markets open. China’s heavy hand over decades was needed to change corporate thinking—from the “cha-ching group.” Moving back onshore (including Taiwan’s TSMC to build in Arizona) became more common. Particularly important was scientific research and chip making staying at home. Biden continued much of this effort. Also, Operation Warp Speed was under Trump. More companies moved out of China.

Volodymyr Zelensky was elected president of Ukraine in 2019 to fight corruption and ending the wat in the Donbas with Putin. He was a comic celebrity rather than a politician. [In the age of media, celebrities almost never lose.] Following Putin propaganda, Trump’s view was Ukraine shouldn’t exist. Trump claimed it was Ukraine that tried to take him down. Then there was Hunter Biden on the board of Burisma. Trump wanted Zelensky to investigate Hunter Biden before he would send Ukraine aid. This led to Trump’s first impeachment.

“In the Trump years, America’s capability to shape the world shrank. Allies were regularly insulted and had no interest in signing up to Washington’s initiatives. Adversaries thrived” (p. 114). Some of Trump’s advisors were effective in promoting public policy. During the COVID pandemic “the president’s own ego, his inability to focus on strategy, and his habit of undercutting policy for his own personal gain” (p. 115) was a disaster.

Part Two: The Arc of History. Chapter 5: Inheriting the Wreckage. Chinese hacking raided much of corporate America. Legislation barred US intelligence agencies from operating in the US, meaning shifting to private firms. The concern was the 2020 election, especially for Russian attacks (by the SVR) on the DNC. SolarWinds provided “network management software” across different systems, amazingly with poor cybersecurity. It was severely hacked—including the federal government, and they didn’t have a clue. Trump refused to concede the election.

“January 6 was an embarrassment for the US and a stain on the country’s democratic ideals. For America’s adversaries, the confrontation provided iconic imagery of what they were eager to advertise as the demise of democracy” (p. 125). Not viable according to Russia and China, just chaos. Biden as an institutionalist trusted the system. The Biden team got no help from the exiting Trump team about anything. “There should have been piles of briefing books” (p. 129).

“While Biden did not face a single international crisis, he knew he would confront a series of interlocking crises in which the boundary between domestic and international was meaningless” (p. 135).

Chapter 6: The End of the Fever Dream. “China’s new breed of ‘wolf warrior’ diplomats—known for their deliberately brusque demeanor, their certainty of America’s decline, and their conviction that Beijing would emerge as the world’s leading superpower” (p. 134). Somehow, they claimed “Chinese-style democracy” was superior.” They started rude with the Biden administration. One problem was China’s neighbors were pushed to the American camp. Threatening and mocking became their new style. That also meant dominating technologies and forcing the world to buy from them. Subsidies was one way to dominate technologies like steel and solar panels.

“American allies and partnerships were the country’s competitive advantage. China had a lot of capabilities. It didn’t have a lot of friends” (p.  139). Beijing did not accept Western-written rules on trade and many others. There were Washington establishment camps. There was the engagement school, including Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Berger. Biden was not a fan. There was the “allies-first,” considering Japan, South Korea, and others. The ideologically extreme school was China was the enemy. Finally, focusing on one regional issue at a time. The globalist school focused on climate change, pandemic preparation, and other long-term issues.

Sanger considered Xi’s paradoxes, seemingly putting security/aggression ahead of economic growth and “a cult of personality” including the certainty of the US in accelerating decline. Biden was moving to a deliberate, strategy-based foreign policy. This included a “three-part squeeze on Beijing” (p. 146): focus on allies and build consensus (using a “listening tour”). The different allies had different interests. Australia worried about Chinese coercion and retaliation. India on border skirmishes. Philippines and Taiwan on the Sout China Sea. Biden wanted to build up US capacity, including chip factories, to survive on its own supply chains (derisking”). Considering China a security threat rather than an economic market.

Chapter 7: A Dangerous Dance. Biden entered the White House in 2021 after January 6. About a third of the country was vaccinated. Ransomware hit Colonial Pipeline causing gas shortages. Cyber security of US firms was poor, and the government gave it little scrutiny. The Biden team was ready to push back against Putin as Russia was staging a military buildup around Ukraine. Ukrainian soldiers were training with NATO forces. The West wanted “stable and predictable,” Putin did not. General Paul Nakasone was the Director of NSA and head of US Cyber Command.

Chapter 8: The Meltdown. The US pulled out of Afghanistan and the so-called government and military (the “ghost army”) melted away, the result of extreme corruption and incompetence, in a country with no history of democracy or appropriate institutions. Under Bush, the US was amazingly bad as nation building. Even US generals understood the US withdrawal would be disastrous. Biden was not impressed (and had heard it all before) and was not the only one believing the US would fail no matter what. Trump gave a withdrawal date, but did not win a second term to carry it out. Biden took over and Afghanistan was in terrible shape with the Taliban controlling much of the country.   

A key was withdrawing refugee and activist groups. The US was in no hurry (the paperwork seemed extreme), assuming the Talban were months away from taking over. The US effectively left (Bagram airbase) in the middle of 2021. Unexpectedly, the Taliban moved quickly. A US relief force under General Chris Donahue landed August 16, finding chaos. President Ghani fled, and Kabul was overrun by the Taliban. Thousands of US-allied Afghanis were stuck, probably to be executed by the Taliban. “The American soldiers were doing what the Taliban wanted—namely, getting everyone the hell out” (p. 182). Burns talked to the Taliban.  An ISIS militant loaded himself with explosives and killed 150 civilians and 13 American soldiers. The last to leave Kabul was Donahue. The White House tried to blame others, but the withdrawal was awful.

Chapter 9: A Sputnik Moment. The relationship with China was dysfunctional, with two sets of rules. China fired a hypersonic rocket, had a “mysterious space plane, and built multiple missile silos, more advanced than US antimissile weapons—scary, like Sputnik in 1957. The US edge in innovation did not translate into developed weapons. Biden welcomed leaders of Australia, India, and Japan for a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

Chapter 10: Blowing Smoke. Victoria Nuland was a Foreign Service veteran, rising to #3 in the State Department, and hated by Putin. Putin claimed a “historic unity of Russia and Ukraine.” Trump was not Zelensky’s pal, being impeached for trying to blackmail Zelensky to incriminate Hunter and Joe Biden. Zelensky made it to Washington in 2021 when Biden was president. The US gave Ukraine more aid but not all he wanted.

“To Biden’s team, Milley was a grumpy hero of sorts” (p. 208). The chapter started back with Putin massing troops to invade Ukraine, with a takeover plan under the assumption the army was competent. The American question: “Who would risk the first full-scale land war in Europe in nearly eight decades to satisfy their ego?” (p. 211). Putin also thought NATO allies were risk-averse and distracted.

Edward Snowden in 2013 leaked NSA projects. In 2017 Wikileaks leaked embarrassing and damaging information, useful to North Koreans and Russians. The US also gathered intelligence. A question was what to release to the public.

Chapter 11: A Partnership Without Limits? To what extent do China and Russia work together? They signed dozens of bilateral agreements, but what was real versus hype? “Khrushchev and Mao had all the instincts and prejudices of nationalists” (p. 228). Kinsinger and Nixon started trips to Beijing in 1971, which Kissinger viewed as “balance of power” politics. Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union fell apart, following by the US as the “unipower.” Russia became a corrupt oligarchy and Putin an autocrat. China boomed with trade, while Russia sold oil. China shared many of their secrets and intelligence with Russia.

Part Three: Wars, Hot and Cold. Chapter 12: Short Invasion, Long War. Start with cyber war in Ukraine. US experts looked for vulnerabilities in Ukraine (“hunt forward operations”). This requires an understanding of all cyber threats. Zelensky was Ukraine’s only leader and rose to the occasion, first by refusing to leave Kyiv: “send ammo, not a taxi.” Early on, the ability to hold Kyiv still in doubt. The Ukrainians fought back and held. Russian forces proved inept. They didn’t bring enough food and created a 40-mile tank traffic jam. Unit commanders had no ability to think on their own. They did not close down Ukrainian communications. Corruptian resulted in wrong parts like tires and spare parts. They failed to use “combined arms operations.” Only the Wagner Group (mercenaries) showed competence.

The US provided considerable information. The Russians shut down Viasat the communications satellite network. Ukraine called on Elon Musk’s Starlink: “Starlink service is now active in Ukraine. More terminals en route,” tweeted Musk. Microsoft and Amazon also provided services, so was Google with Google Maps. Putin did not tell the forces they were going into battle. General Chris Donahue’s 82nd Airborne was in Poland to prepare for evacuations.

“The Russians hadn’t planned a combat operation. They’d planned for a fairly bloodless takeover, believing that most of Ukraine was on their side and that a quick move on the capital—a ‘decapitation strike’—could take out leadership” (p. 252). The Ukrainians had trained with NATO including flexibility and logistics.

Chapter 13. Boiling the Frog. The US position was to support Ukraine without ending up in WWIII. “Ukraine’s defense demands had changed—from defending Kyiv to defending vast sections of Ukraine’s industrial east” (p. 267). The Defense Department was concerned with the current situation. Blinken and State were focused on the long term, mainly to deter Putin. The Russians had dug into the Donbas.

Chapter 14: Crossing the Line. Taiwan was not considered a country as only mainland China was given full rights. Taiwan moved toward democracy and development. They focused on semiconductor manufacturing, introduced by RCA. China became a major Taiwan trading partner. Xi controlled Hong Kong first (arresting all protestors), then focused on Taiwan. Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, creating a firestorm in Beijing.

Chapter 15. The Nuclear Paradox. “The war-gaming at the Pentagon and at think tanks around Washington imagined Putin’s use of a tactical nuclear weapon … could come in a variety of circumstances” (p. 299), like Ukraine winning and Russian troops fleeing. Commercial nuclear reactors can be held hostage. The US served as a Ukrainian quartermaster. The “nuclear paradox”: increase Ukrainian success the likelier of a nuclear response from Putin. A key from the Cuban Missile Crisis: do not put the enemy in a humiliating defeat (versus nuclear option).

Trump pulled out of Obama’s negotiated nuclear agreement with Iran, creating a new enemy and potential nuclear power.

Chapter 16: A High Fence for a Small Yard. Taiwan Semiconductor (under engineer Morris Chang) manufacturers the best level of semiconductors, a juicy target for China. The US innovated chips at Fairchild, Texas Instruments, Intel, and Motorola, then stopped manufacturing them in the US—a bad idea given Chinese aggression (especially after they crushed Hong Kong dissent) and supply chain problems discovered during COVID. Nvidia became an additional high-tech player (and competitor with Microsoft and Apple as the most valuable corporation). The term “Silicon Shield” became important enough for Biden to fund new manufacturing plants. US chip manufacturing had dropped to 12% of the total. Biden wanted a “manufacturing renaissance” including manufacturing sophisticated chips. Intel would build a “semiconductor megasite”—that is, when including government funding. Thus, the CHIPS Act with a $52 billion pot of money. The major problem was the greater cost of building in the US. This was on top of an infrastructure bill, batteries for electric cars, biotech, AI, improved childcare, and fighting climate change. Part of the plan was to block the sale of advanced chips to China and ban trade with specific companies or individuals.

Chapter 17. Don’t Make Us Choose. India was a natural partner to the US to counter Chinese expansion. It was difficult to get both Japan and South Korea on board together. Chinese Belt and Road initiative led to accumulated debt (“debt-trap diplomacy’), and problems with corruption and safety delays. China then had access to strategic infrastructure. “You engage willing partners; you use diplomacy to manage difficult relationships, to keep small problems from spinning into large confrontations” (p. 354). China had problems with COVID and real estate debt crisis, plus a declining population. Then the Chinese spy balloon over the US and the “balloon gap.” It was shot down, but the FBI did not release any information.

Part Four: Fighting For Control. Chapter 18. Searching For Endgames. NATO with the US in the lead sent considerable aid to Ukraine, but divided on what and when it should be sent. Russia leaving is the expected endgame, assuming the Russians will not repeat it. Despite immense losses they weren’t leaving, resulting in a stalemate. What would a negotiated settlement look like? Republicans claimed Biden cared more about Ukrainians than Americans. Russia claimed the West started the war. Finland decided to give up “Finlandization” and join NATO (Finland was a member of the EU). Ditto Sweden. Turkey got concessions to agree.

Chapter 19. The Digital Wars—and Its Limits. US intelligence had considerable information on Russian troops in Ukraine. Ukrainian built on-the-spot drones cheaply, even sinking Russian ships in the Black Sea. Even high school students were making drones. (Making parts on the battlefield was not a US thing. Russian trenches and minefields made the stalemate. Ukraine was tech-savvy which had limitations against trenches. The US was following suit in small, autonomous, and cheap drones so that many could be produced and used in mass.

Chapter 20: The Downward Spiral. “Mercenary warlord” Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner Group, marched on Moscow in rebellion against the defense establishment and challenging Putin’s war. He gave up before reaching Moscow, presumably placated and agreeing to exile in Belarus. He died when a bomb went off in the jet he was riding in, likely Putin’s revenge. Putin likely waited for Trump to be elected, then conquer Ukraine.

Over time, Russia was learning from their mistakes, with logistics, on the battlefield, and evading sanctions—plus the massive revenue from oil and gas. It was roughly a stalemate in Ukraine, with large losses and a poor economic outlook. They exported grain, but less than needed. Biden and Schmidt in Germany were reluctant to give highly sophisticated weapons to Ukraine. In Biden’s case it was the fear that a desperate Putin would use nukes. He relented as Russian resistance got stronger. Ukraine generals often dismissed American military advice.

China’s confronted the US and advanced countries in Asia. Xi’s obsession with control had an economic cost and China had problems: too much debt, property companies going bankrupt, low birthrate, inflation, and more. Rich Chinese were migrating or at least buying second homes elsewhere. American businesses were looking at China as uninvestable became of intellectual property theft, raiding US offices, and the Chinese slowdown. Finally, US policy became to stop chip sales to China or the equipment to make their own chips. Top leaders in the Chinese government were disappearing.

As the Middle East seemed to be relatively calm, Hamas militants attacked from the Gaza Strip killing and capturing hundreds of Israelis. Middle East violence returned. Netanyahu attempting autocratic power proved incompetent. The major result was killing thousands of Gazans without showing much progress either to eliminate Hamas or get back the hostages. Biden called for restraint, which Netanyahu ignored and openly insulted Biden.

Epilogue. “This is not the world we wanted, or were trying to shape, after the Cold War”: Anthony Blinken (p. 435). “The post-Cold War era … was marked by such exponential wealth production and technological progress that no one could imagine reverting to a pre-networked, pre-globalized age. The key to keeping it going was cooperation among the major nations benefited most. … Globalization is out; self-reliance and control of a nation’s own supply chains are in. Nationalism is back in vogue, and so are the strongmen who preach it. … Trench warfare is back in Europe. … Acts of mass terror never truly ceased” (p. 436). Putin’s move toward China and Iran gives him technology and staying power. AI increases disinformation and ransomware attacks.